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Abstract
Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the
shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of
error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash
equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but
never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed
with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own
mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the
other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the
iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting
strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n− 1 rounds. A
friendly-rivalry strategy inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no
mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of neutral
drift, and our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the
proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions.
Author summary
How to maintain cooperation among a number of self-interested individuals is a difficult
problem, especially if they can sometimes commit error. In this work, we propose a
strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game based on the following five rules:
Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish others’
defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other
circumstances. These rules are not far from actual human behavior, and the resulting
strategy guarantees three advantages: First, if everyone uses it, full cooperation is
recovered even if error occurs with small probability. Second, the player of this strategy
always never obtains a lower long-term payoff than any of the co-players. Third, if the
co-players are unconditional cooperators, it obtains a strictly higher long-term payoff
than theirs. Therefore, if everyone uses this strategy, no one has a reason to change it.
Furthermore, our simulation shows that this strategy will become highly abundant over
long time scales due to its robustness against the invasion of other strategies. In this
sense, the repeated social dilemma is solved for an arbitrary number of players.
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Introduction
The success of Homo sapiens can be attributed to its ability to organize collective action
toward a common goal among a group of genetically unrelated individuals [1], and this
ability is becoming more and more important as the world is getting close to each other.
Researchers have identified several mechanisms to promote cooperation in terms of
evolutionary game theory [2, 3]. For example, the folk theorem holds that repeated
interaction can establish cooperation through reciprocal strategies, and this mechanism
is called direct reciprocity [4]. Yet, how to resolve a conflict between individual and
collective interests is a hard problem, especially when a large number of players are
involved and they are prone to error [5–7], because an individual player has very limited
control over co-players.
In this respect, the discovery of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) has been deemed counter-intuitive because a ZD-strategic
player can unilaterally fix the co-player’s long-term payoff or enforce a linear
relationship between their long-term payoffs [8]. For instance, one can design an
extortionate ZD strategy, with which the player’s long-term payoff will increase by χ ≥ 1
whenever the co-player’s does by one unit payoff. Another counter-intuitive aspect of
the ZD strategy is that it is a memory-one strategy referring only to the previous round,
so that such a simple strategy can perfectly constrain the co-player’s long-term payoff
regardless of the co-player’s strategic complexity. Of course, the excellent performance
in a one-to-one match does not necessarily mean evolutionary success: It is difficult for
an extortionate strategy to proliferate in a population because, as its fraction increases,
two extortionate players are more likely to meet and keep defecting against each
other [9–12]. For this reason, especially in a large population, selection tends to favor a
generous ZD strategy whose long-term payoff does not exceed the co-player’s [11]. A
generous ZD strategy does not aim at winning a match, but it is efficient by forming
mutual cooperation when they meet each other.
The important point in this line of thought is that a player’s strategy can
unilaterally impose constraints on the co-player’s long-term payoff, so that we can now
characterize strategies according to the constraints that they impose. One such
meaningful characterization scheme is to ask if a strategy works as a ‘partner’ or as a
‘rival’ [13,14]: By ‘partner’, we mean that the strategy seeks for mutual cooperation, but
that it will make the co-player’s payoff less than its own if the co-player defects from it.
It has also been called ‘good’ [15,16], and the generous ZD strategies can be understood
as an intersection between the ZD and partner strategies [11]. On the other hand, a
rival strategy always makes its long-term payoff higher than or equal to the co-player’s,
so it has been called ‘unbeatable’ [17], ‘competitive’ [13], or ‘defensible’ [18, 19]. A
trivial example of a rival strategy is unconditional defection (AllD), and an extortionate
ZD strategy also falls into this class. Most of well-known strategies in the iterated PD
game are classified either as a partner or as a rival [14]. However, which class is more
favored by selection depends on environmental conditions such as the population size
and the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation: If the population is small and cooperation
is costly, it is better off to play a rival strategy than to play a partner strategy, and vice
versa [11, 14, 20]. If a single strategy acts as a partner and a rival simultaneously, it has
important implications in evolutionary dynamics because it possesses evolutionary
robustness regardless of the environmental conditions, in the sense that no mutant
strategy can invade a population of this strategy with greater fixation probability than
that of neutral drift [11, 20–22]. To indicate the partner-rival duality, such a strategy
will be called a ‘friendly rival’ [22]. Tit-for-tat (TFT), a special ZD strategy having
χ = 1, is a friendly rival in an error-free environment [14], but a friendly rival generally
requires a far more complicated structure in the presence of error. So far, the existence
of friendly-rivalry strategies has been reported by a brute-force enumeration method in
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Fig 1. Memory length m required for each of currently known friendly-rivalry
strategies in the n-person PG game [18,19,22]. The dashed blue line depicts a
theoretical lower bound m = n for friendly rivalry [19], and the strategy proposed in
this work, called CAPRI-n, has m = 2n− 1.
the iterated PD game [18,22,23] and the three-person public-goods (PG) game [19].
However, it is not straightforward to extend these findings to the general n-person PG
game. For example, a naive extension of a solution in the iterated PD game fails to solve
the three-person PG game because the third player cannot tell if one of the co-players is
correcting the other’s error with good intent or just carrying out a malicious attack [19].
To resolve the ambiguity, a strategic decision must be based on more information of the
past interactions: In fact, if a player refers to the previous m rounds to choose an action
in the n-person PG game, we can show that m must be greater than or equal to n as a
necessary condition to be a friendly rival [19]. Unfortunately, the existing brute-force
approach then becomes simply unfeasible because the number of possible strategies
expands super-exponentially as 22
mn
. For example, in the three-person game (n = 3), it
means that we have to enumerate 2512 ∼ 10154 possibilities to find an answer. Although
the symmetry among co-players reduces this number down to 2288 ∼ 1086, it is still
comparable to the estimated number of protons in the universe.
In this work, by using an alternative method to generalize behavioral patterns of a
friendly rival for the iterated PD game [22], we construct a friendly-rivalry strategy for
the n-person PG game. This approach makes use of the fact that it greatly lessens the
computational burden if we only check whether a given strategy qualifies as a friendly
rival. The required memory length of our strategy is m = 2n− 1, which satisfies the
necessary condition m ≥ n as shown in Fig. 1. We will also numerically confirm that it
shows excellent performance in evolutionary dynamics due to its evolutionary
robustness.
Materials and methods
Public-goods game
Let us consider the n-person public-goods (PG) game, in which a player may choose
either cooperation (c), by contributing a token to a public pool, or defection (d), by
refusing it. Let the number of cooperators be denoted as nc. The nc tokens in the
public pool are multiplied by a factor of ρ, where 1 < ρ < n, and then equally
redistributed to the n players. We assume that the tokens are infinitely divisible. A
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player’s payoff is thus given as{
ρnc
n when the player chooses c,
1 + ρncn when the player chooses d.
(1)
Clearly, it is always better off to choose d regardless of nc, so full defection is the only
Nash equilibrium of this one-shot game. In this study, this game will be repeated
indefinitely with no discounting factor to facilitate direct reciprocity. Every player can
choose an action between c and d by referring to the previous m rounds. At the same
time, a player can make implementation error, e.g., by choosing d while intending c and
vice versa, with small probability e 1.
Axiomatic approach
Let us consider a strategy profile P = {Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σn} of n players. Player X’s
long-term payoff is defined as
ΠX ≡ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
pi
(t)
X , (2)
where pi
(t)
X is player X’s instantaneous payoff in round t. If e > 0, the Markovian
dynamics of strategic interaction for a given strategy profile P converges to a unique
stationary distribution, from which ΠX can readily be calculated [24,25]. In terms of
the players’ long-term payoffs, we wish to propose the following three criteria that a
successful strategy Ω should satisfy [18,19,22,26].
1. Efficiency: Mutual cooperation must be achieved with probability one as e→ 0 if
all the players have adopted Ω. In other words, this criterion requires
lime→0+ ΠX = ρ when P = PΩ ≡ {Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω}.
2. Defensibility: It must be guaranteed that none of the co-players can obtain higher
long-term payoffs against Ω regardless of their strategies and initial states when
e = 0. It implies that lime→0+ (ΠX −ΠY ) ≥ 0, where player X is using strategy
ΣX = Ω and Y denotes any possible co-player of X.
3. Distinguishability: If ΣX = Ω and all the co-players are unconditional cooperators
(AllC), player X can exploit them to earn a strictly higher long-term payoff than
theirs. That is, ΠX > ΠY when Y is an AllC player.
When a strategy satisfies defensibility and efficiency, the strategy is a friendly rival. A
symmetric strategy profile which consists of a friendly-rivalry strategy forms a
cooperative Nash equilibrium [18,19,22]. The third criterion is a requirement to
suppress invasion of AllC due to neutral drift in the evolutionary context [27–29]. We
call a strategy ‘successful’ if it meets all the above three criteria. Depending on the
definition of successfulness, one could choose a different set of axioms for an alternative
characterization [30].
Strategy design
Let us construct a deterministic strategy with memory length m = 2n− 1 and show
that the proposed strategy indeed meets all of the above three criteria. In the following,
we will take an example of three players (n = 3) who are called Alice (A), Bob (B), and
Charlie (C), respectively, and choose Alice as a focal player playing this strategy.
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Before proceeding, it is convenient to introduce some notations for the sake of brevity.
The three players’ history profile over the previous m = 5 rounds can be represented as
ht = (At−5At−4At−3At−2At−1;Bt−5Bt−4Bt−3Bt−2Bt−1;Ct−5Ct−4Ct−3Ct−2Ct−1),
where Aτ , Bτ , and Cτ denote their respective actions at round τ . The last round of full
cooperation will be denoted by t∗. In addition, we introduce a binary variable λ(t)X
which equals one if Xt = d and zero otherwise for player X ∈ {A,B,C}. According to
the payoff matrix [Eq. (1)], Alice’s payoff in round t can be rewritten as
pi
(t)
A = ρ
[
1− 1
n
∑
X
λ
(t)
X
]
−
[
1− λ(t)A
]
, (3)
which has linear dependence on λ
(t)
X for every X. This linearity implies that Alice’s
total payoff
∑
t pi
(t)
A in the iterated game is fully determined by counting every player’s
total number of defections, i.e.,
∑
t λ
(t)
X for every X: For example, if all the players have
defected the same number of times, their payoffs must be the same irrespective of the
exact history. Let ∆τ1,τ2A thus denote Alice’s number of defections in [τ1, τ2]. Likewise,
we can define ∆τ1,τ2B for Bob and ∆
τ1,τ2
C for Charlie. We also define Nd as the maximum
difference among the players in numbers of defections over the previous m rounds:
Nd ≡ max
i,j∈{A,B,C}
∣∣∣∆t−m,t−1i −∆t−m,t−1j ∣∣∣ . (4)
With these notations, we can now design a successful strategy satisfying all the three
criteria simultaneously. To this end, we divide the set of history profiles into three
mutually exclusive cases: The first case is that full cooperation occurred in the last
round (t∗ = t− 1). The second case is that it is not in the last round but still in their
memory (t−m ≤ t∗ < t− 1). The third case is that no player remembers the last round
of full cooperation (t∗ < t−m). Let us consider these cases one by one, together with
adequate rules for each.
1. t∗ = t− 1
• Cooperate: If this is the case, Alice has to choose c under the condition that
Nd < n. For example, the inequality is true for (ccccc; cccdc; ccccc), for
which Nd = 1. On the other hand, it is not true for (cdddc; ccddc; ccccc)
because its Nd = 3 is equal to n.
2. t−m ≤ t∗ < t− 1
• Accept: Alice has to accept punishment from the co-players by choosing c,
under the condition that ∆t
∗,t−1
A ≥ ∆t
∗,t−1
B and ∆
t∗,t−1
A ≥ ∆t
∗,t−1
C in
addition to Nd < n. For example, c will be prescribed to Alice at
(cccdc; ccccd, ccccc), where we have t∗ = t− 3, ∆t∗,t−1A = ∆t
∗,t−1
B = 1,
∆t
∗,t−1
C = 0, and Nd = 1, which satisfies the above inequalities. On the other
hand, the condition is not met by (ccddd; ccddd; ccccc) which gives Nd = 3.
• Punish: Alice has to punish the co-players by choosing d, under the
condition that ∆t
∗,t−1
A < ∆
t∗,t−1
B or ∆
t∗,t−1
A < ∆
t∗,t−1
C in addition to Nd < n.
For example, d is prescribed at (ccccd; cccdd, ccccc) because Nd = 2 and
Alice has defected fewer times than Bob since the last round of full
cooperation at t∗ = t− 3.
3. t∗ < t−m
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Fig 2. Schematic diagram of the transition between states of CAPRI-n. The five rules
of the strategy can be identified with the player’s internal states [26], each of which is
represented as a node in this diagram. An exception is state I, which corresponds to two
nodes to clarify the following point: when t∗ ≥ t−m, I may have outgoing connections
to A and P . When t∗ < t−m, on the other hand, the only possible next state is limited
to R. A blue (red) node means that the player has to choose c (d) at the internal state.
We have omitted error-caused transitions for the sake of simplicity.
• Recover: Alice has to recover cooperation by choosing c, under the condition
that all the players except one cooperated in the last round. For n = 3, it
means (ddddd, ddddc, ddddc) and its permutations.
4. In all the other cases, defect.
A strategy of this sort for the n-person PG game will be called CAPRI-n after the first
letters of the five constitutive rules. Note that these five rules may be implemented in a
number of different ways [22], and we take this way because it provides the most
straightforward way to prove the three criteria. Each of the rules can also be regarded
as the player’s internal state consisting of multiple history profiles [26]. For example,
Alice can find herself at state R, the abbreviation for ‘Recover’, when her history profile
is (ddddd, ddddc, ddddc), at which she must choose c. The connection structure of the
above five states is graphically represented in Fig. 2, which is helpful for understanding
how defensibility and efficiency are realized as shown below.
Let us begin by checking defensibility. Our CAPRI-n player Alice cooperates only at
states C, A, and R, so the question is whether she can be forced to visit one of these
states repeatedly with giving a strictly higher payoff to one of her co-players. If Alice’s
state is C, it means that everyone cooperated at t− 1. If some of her co-players defect
from this full cooperation at t, she will retaliate at t+ 1 with state P, so she experiences
unilateral defection at most once. Full cooperation is already broken, so it must be only
through state A or R if she comes back to C. The former case means that Alice has
already been compensated for the payoff loss. In the latter case, the only possible
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history profile is (ddddd, ddddc, ddddc) unless she made a mistake, which means the
compensation has been done in the last round. Finally, state A can be accessed from
states P and I, at both of which one cannot exploit Alice who chooses d. To sum up, it
is impossible to have the unilateral cooperation of a CAPRI-n player repeatedly.
The next criterion is efficiency. Provided that CAPRI-n is employed by all the
players, only full cooperation or full defection can be a stationary state, and we can
verify this statement by checking each possible case:
• If t∗ = t− 1, everyone have to cooperate again as prescribed at state C, so full
cooperation will continue.
• If t−m ≤ t∗ < t− 1 and Nd < n, some players must be at state A while the
others are at state P. The latter players at P will keep defecting until satisfying
∆t
∗,t−1
A = ∆
t∗,t−1
B = ∆
t∗,t−1
C . If they make it with keeping t
∗ ≥ t−m, all of them
should choose c as prescribed at state A, and the resulting mutual cooperation
will continue. If they don’t, the situation to everyone reduces to state I, at which
they will defect over and over.
• The remaining state is R, but it is always transient.
In order to judge efficiency, we need to consider error-caused transition between these
two stationary states, i.e., full cooperation and full defection. The transition from the
latter to the former is possible only through state R, which occurs with probability of
O(en−1). On the other hand, full cooperation can be made robust against every possible
type of (n− 1)-bit error if m = 2n− 1: Imagine that a player, say, Bob, mistakenly
defects from full cooperation at t = 1. He will have state A at t = 2, while the others
have state P, so their payoffs should be equalized at t = 3 as a result of punishment.
Note that this simple recovery from a single-bit error takes only two rounds. However, if
this is interrupted at t = 3 by another mistake occurring to any of the players, it will
need additional two rounds to reach full cooperation at t = 5. The following example
shows how Bob’s mistakes at t = 1 and 3 are corrected:
A : ccccc ccccd cccdc ccdcd cdcdc
B : ccccd cccdc ccdcd cdcdc dcdcc
C : ccccc ccccd cccdc ccdcd cdcdc
. (5)
Among all types of (n− 1)-bit error, the longest memory length is needed to correct this
kind of error that occurs every other round, so it requires m = 2(n− 1) + 1 in total,
where the last bit has been added to memorize the last round of full cooperation.
Therefore, with memory length m = 2n− 1, the transition probability from mutual
cooperation to defection can be suppressed down to O(en). Therefore, the players form
full cooperation in the limit of e→ 0, fulfilling the efficiency criterion.
The last criterion is distinguishability. If the others are AllC players, our CAPRI-n
player will continue unilateral defection when she defected n consecutive times by error,
as prescribed by I. One can escape from such a state with probability of O(en) due to
the condition of Nd < n for the rule C, so this stationary state coexists with full
cooperation in the limit of e→ 0.
Evolutionary simulation
We consider a standard stochastic model proposed in [29], where a well-mixed
population of size N evolves over time by an imitation process. A key assumption of
this model is that the mutation rate is low so that at most one mutant strategy can
exist in the resident population. In other words, the time that it takes to go extinct or
occupy the whole population by selection is assumed to be much shorter than the time
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scale of mutation. Let us assume that a mutant strategy x is introduced to a population
of strategy y. The population dynamics is modeled by the frequency-dependent Moran
process, in which the fixation probability of the mutant is given in a closed from:
φxy =
N−1∑
i=0
i∏
j=1
Γj
−1 (6)
with Γj ≡ Pj,j−1/Pj,j+1, where Pj,j±1 denotes the probability that the number of
mutants increases or decreases from j by one.
For n = 2, the fixation probability is calculated in the following way: Suppose that
we have j individuals of the mutant strategy and N − j individuals of the resident
strategy. If we randomly choose a mutant and a resident individual, their average
payoffs are obtained as {
sx =
1
N−1 [(j − 1)sxx + (N − j)sxy]
sy =
1
N−1 [(N − j − 1)syy + jsyx] ,
(7)
respectively, where sαβ is α’s long-term payoff against β. According to the imitation
process, x can change to y with probability fx→y defined as follows:
fx→y =
1
1 + exp [σ(sx − sy)] , (8)
where σ means the strength of selection. Then, we have
Γj = exp [σ(sy − sx)] , (9)
and the fixation probability is calculated as
φ−1xy =
N−1∑
i=0
i∏
j=1
eσ[(N−j−1)syy+jsyx−(j−1)sxx−(N−j)sxy]/(N−1) (10)
=
N−1∑
i=0
eσi[(−i+2N−3)syy+(i+1)syx−(−i+2N−1)sxy−(i−1)sxx]/[2(N−1)]. (11)
For n = 3, the fixation probability is calculated in a similar way. We randomly pick
up three players from a well-mixed population, and the respective average payoffs of
playing x and y can be written by using the binomial coefficients as follows:sx =
1
(N−1)(N−2)
[(
j−1
2
)
sxxx +
(
j−1
1
)(
N−j
1
)
sxxy +
(
N−j
2
)
sxyy
]
sy =
1
(N−1)(N−2)
[(
j
2
)
syxx +
(
N−j−1
1
)(
j
1
)
syyx +
(
N−j−1
2
)
syyy
]
,
(12)
where sαβγ is player α’s long-term payoff against co-players β and γ. Plugging these
expressions into Eqs. (6) and (9), one can calculate the fixation probability φxy for the
three-person case as well.
We can interpret φxy as transition probability from y to x from the viewpoint of the
population. From the stationary distribution of this Markovian dynamics, we can thus
calculate abundance of each available strategy in a numerically exact manner [31,32].
For the sake of simplicity, we use the donation game as a simplified form of the PD
game as well as its generalization to n players in the numerical calculation. That is,
with the benefit of cooperation b > 1, each player can donate b/(n− 1) to each co-player
at the unit cost, which corresponds to ρ = nb/[b+ (n− 1)] up to scaling.
August 4, 2020 8/15
payoff of CAPRI-n
n=2 n=3 n=4
pa
yo
ff 
of
 c
o-
pl
ay
er
s
Fig 3. Distribution of long-term payoffs when a CAPRI-n player meets co-players
whose pµν ’s are randomly sampled from the unit interval. The multiplication factors for
n = 2, 3, and 4 are 1.5, 2, and 3, respectively, and the solid lines indicate the region of
feasible payoffs. In each case, the filled circle means the long-term payoffs when
CAPRI-n is adopted by all the players, whereas the cross shows those of TFT players as
a reference point.
Results
Friendly rivalry
To check the validity of our construction, we examined the three criteria by using
graph-theoretic calculations [19, 22, 33]. For n = 2, we directly confirmed that CAPRI-n
is indeed a successful strategy satisfying all the three criteria. For n = 3, we conducted
mapping to an automaton to obtain a simplified yet equivalent graph representation [26],
and the resulting automaton indeed passed all the criteria. For n = 4, the required
amount of calculation to directly check the criteria was beyond our computational
resources, so we employed a Monte Carlo method to simulate the game. The Monte
Carlo method was also used to double-check the performance of CAPRI-2 and CAPRI-3.
The Monte Carlo calculation was performed as follows: Let us denote a memory-one
strategy as (pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd) where pµν means the player’s probability to cooperate
when the player and the co-player did µ and ν, respectively, in the previous round. The
initial µ and ν can be omitted in the strategy description because they are irrelevant to
the long-term payoff as long as e > 0. Figure 3 shows the distribution of payoffs when
Alice used CAPRI-n whereas each of her co-players’ strategies was composed of four
pµν ’s randomly sampled from the unit interval. The co-players’ payoffs never exceeded
Alice’s, as required by defensibility.
We also calculated the probability of full cooperation for n = 2, 3 and 4 when
CAPRI-n was adopted by all the players in order to check efficiency. By using
linear-algebraic [18,19] or Monte Carlo calculation, For e = 10−4, we obtained 0.999,
0.997, 0.978 for n = 2, 3, and 4, respectively, which supports the conclusion that they
all satisfy the efficiency criterion.
Evolutionary robustness
Before checking the evolutionary performance of our proposed strategy, we conducted
simulations without CAPRI-n for comparison. Figures 4(a) and 5(a) show the results
when the strategies were sampled from deterministic memory-one for n = 2 and 3.
When b was low and/or N was small, defensible strategies such as AllD tended to be
favored by selection, and the resulting cooperation level was low. On the other hand,
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n = 2(a) without CAPRI-2
(b) with CAPRI-2
defensible efficient
other
defensible
efficient
other
defensible
efficient
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CAPRI-2 CAPRI-2
efficientdefensible
other
Fig 4. Abundance of strategies for n = 2 as the benefit-to-cost ratio b and the
population size N vary. The default values were b = 3 and N = 30 unless otherwise
specified. The strength of selection and the error probability were set to be σ = 1 and
e = 10−4, respectively. (a) Simulation result with 16 memory-one deterministic
strategies, classified into three categories, i.e., efficient, defensible, and the other
strategies. (b) Effect of CAPRI-2 when it was added to the available set of strategies.
when b or N was large, efficient strategies were favored, and they achieved a high level
of cooperation. The reason is that cooperative strategies maintained high payoffs by
interacting with many other cooperators even if they were exploited by a small number
of aggressive mutants.
When CAPRI-n was introduced, it occupied a large amount of the population as
shown in Figs. 4(b) and 5(b). Whereas each memory-one strategy flourished depending
on the environmental parameters b and N , CAPRI-n was found abundant in the entire
parameter region. In particular, it is striking that CAPRI-3 overwhelms all the other
strategies in the three-person PG game for any moderate sizes of b and N [Fig. 5(b)].
It is nevertheless worth pointing out that CAPRI-2 gave more and more room to
efficient strategies in the iterated PD game as b or N increases [Fig. 4(b)], and this is
due to neutral drift: Although CAPRI-2 earns a strictly higher long-term payoff than
AllC= (1, 1, 1, 1) and Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) = (1, 0, 0, 1), it does not with respect
to (1, 1, 1, 0), which can, in turn, be invaded by WSLS. For this reason, WSLS can
become abundant in the presence of (1, 1, 1, 0) when the environmental conditions are
favorable.
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n = 3(a) without CAPRI-3
(b) with CAPRI-3
defensible
efficient
other
other
defensible
efficient
CAPRI-3
defensible
other
CAPRI-3
defensible
other
Fig 5. Abundance of strategies for n = 3 as the benefit-to-cost ratio b and the
population size N vary. The default values were b = 3 and N = 30 unless otherwise
specified. The strength of selection and the error probability were set to be σ = 1 and
e = 10−4, respectively. (a) Simulation result with 64 memory-one deterministic
strategies, classified into three categories, i.e., efficient, defensible, and the other
strategies. (b) Effect of CAPRI-3 when it was added to the available set of strategies.
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Discussion
In summary, we have constructed a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person
PG game. It maintains a cooperative Nash equilibrium in the presence of
implementation error with probability e 1, and it has evolutionary robustness
regardless of the environmental conditions such as the population size and the strength
of selection. In this sense, the n-person social dilemma is solved. The strategy requires
memory of the previous m = 2n− 1 rounds and consists of the following five rules:
Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish others’
defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other
circumstances.
Although we have considered only implementation error, perception error can also be
corrected if it occurs with sufficiently low probability: The disagreement between the
players’ history profiles due to the perception error will soon be removed at full
defection, and the players will escape from mutual defection with probability of O(en).
Unless another perception error perturbs this process, the players will eventually arrive
at full cooperation, overcoming the perception error.
Another important solution concept to the n-person dilemma can be derived from a
different set of criteria: By requiring mutual cooperation, error correction, and
retaliation with a time scale of k rounds, one can characterize the all-or-none (AON-k)
strategy, which is defined as prescribing c only when everyone cooperated or no one did
in each of the previous k rounds [30,34,35]. For example, WSLS= (1, 0, 0, 1) is
equivalent to AON-1. For each k, one can find a threshold of the multiplication factor
above which AON-k constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium [30]. AON-k performs
well in evolutionary simulation because it prescribes d as the default action, just as
CAPRI-n does in state I, unless the players have synchronized their behavior over the
previous k rounds. As a result, it earns a strictly higher payoff against a broad range of
strategies.
In general, CAPRI-n with m = 2n− 1 can repeatedly exploit the other co-players
playing AON-k if k < m− 1, which means that an AON-k population can readily be
invaded by CAPRI-n unless k is large enough. Considering the condition for AON-k to
be subgame perfect, one could speculate that AON with small k can be abundant in an
environment with a high multiplication factor. However, our finding implies that such a
simple solution may not be sustained when CAPRI-n is available. This is especially
crucial when population size is not large enough because AON-k lacks defensibility.
Still, AON-k remains as a strong competitor to CAPRI-n in evolutionary simulation:
For example, although WSLS earns a strictly less payoff against CAPRI-2, it
circumvented the difficulty of fixation with the aid of a third strategy (1, 1, 1, 0).
From a practical point of view, it is worth noting that the five rules of CAPRI-n
mostly refer to two factors: One is the players’ last action at t− 1, and the other is the
differences in the players’ respective numbers of defections over the previous m rounds.
In other words, exact details of the history profile are irrelevant, and this point greatly
reduces the cognitive burden to play this strategy. In fact, according to a recent
experiment, people assign reputation to their co-players based mainly on their last
action and their average numbers of defection [36]. This could explain the reason that
such a delicate relationship called friendly rivalry can develop spontaneously and
unwittingly among a group of people. How to keep such a relation healthy and
productive has so far been acquired as tacit knowledge surrounded by anecdotes and
experiences, and CAPRI-n expresses its essential how-tos in a form of explicit
knowledge which can be designed, analyzed, and transmitted systematically.
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